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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to decide if a criminal fine is entitled to 
priority as an administrative expense under Chapter 7 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The fine was imposed upon a debtor 
in possession for post-petition conduct that violated 
Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act. 
Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Resources 
("DER") filed a proof of claim in which it asserted that it 
was entitled to have the fine paid as an administrative 
expense under S 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The 
bankruptcy court disagreed, and sustained the trustee's 
objection to the proof of claim. The district court affirmed. 
We hold that a post-petition criminal fine is not an 
administrative expense under Chapter 7, and therefore we 
affirm. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History  
 
On August 14, 1990, Tri-State Clinical Laboratories, Inc. 
filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. A few months later, on October 4, 
1990, two municipal workers were sprayed with blood while 
emptying a dumpster located behind Tri-State's place of 
business. The blood came from test tubes that Tri-State 
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had illegally placed in the dumpster. The test tubes would 
have been collected and deposited in a municipal landfill 
had they not been discovered. 
 
On January 21, 1992, the Office of Attorney General filed 
a criminal complaint charging Tri-State with violations of 
Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act for illegally 
disposing of infectious waste. Count I of the complaint 
charged Tri-State with unlawfully storing municipal waste 
on or about July 18, 1990 (before Tri-State hadfiled its 
Chapter 11 petition). Count II charged Tri-State with 
unlawfully disposing of infectious waste in the dumpster on 
or about October 4, 1990 (after Tri-State had filed its 
Chapter 11 petition). 
 
On September 10, 1992, Joseph P. Nigro was appointed 
Chapter 11 Trustee. Shortly thereafter, on October 6, 1992, 
the case was converted to Chapter 7, and Mr. Nigro was 
appointed the Chapter 7 Trustee. 
 
On July 28, 1994, while the Chapter 7 proceedings were 
still pending, the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland 
County convicted Tri-State on Counts I and II of the 
complaint and imposed a fine of $10,000 for the violation 
charged in Count I, and a fine of $20,000 for the violation 
charged in Count II. It is undisputed that thesefines were 
punitive in nature, and unrelated to actual costs or 
expenses incurred by the DER. 
 
On August 19, 1994, the DER filed a proof of claim 
asserting a $10,000 subordinated unsecured claim under 
11 U.S.C. S 726(a)(4); and a $20,000 claim for 
administrative expenses pursuant to 11 U.S.C. SS 503(b), 
507(a)(1), and 726(a)(1).1 The trustee objected to treating 
the $20,000 fine as an administrative expense. However, 
there was no objection to allowing the $10,000 claim for 
pre-petition conduct under 11 U.S.C. S 726(a)(4), and that 
fine is not an issue in this appeal. 
 
The bankruptcy court concluded that administrative 
expenses must be claimed by filing a "request for payment," 
and not by filing a "proof of claim." Accordingly, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The bankruptcy court had previously granted the DER's motion to file 
a proof of claim beyond the bar date. 
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bankruptcy court held that "[its previous] order granting 
the DER leave to file its proof of claim beyond the bar date 
is, in effect, a nullity." In the alternative, the court held that 
the $20,000 fine for post-petition criminal conduct is not 
an administrative expense under S 503(b). Instead, the 
court allowed the DER to pursue the fine as an unsecured 
claim. 
 
The district court subsequently affirmed the bankruptcy 
court's determination that the $20,000 fine was not an 
administrative expense. Thus, it was not necessary for the 
district court to decide if it agreed with the bankruptcy 
court's conclusion that an administrative expense must be 
asserted in a request for payment, rather than a proof of 
claim. This appeal followed.2 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. 
 
The DER contends that the $20,000 fine imposed upon 
the debtor in possession for conduct that occurred after it 
filed the petition must be given priority status as an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court's appellate jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(c) and 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district Court's 
bankruptcy decision. Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 
F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1981). "Because the bankruptcy court, rather than 
the district Court, was the trier of fact in this case, we are in as good 
a 
position as the district court to review the findings of the bankruptcy 
court, so we review the bankruptcy court's findings by the standards the 
district court should employ, to determine whether the district court 
erred in its review." In re Fegeley, 118 F.3d 979, 982 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, we review the bankruptcy 
court's findings of fact for clear error, and exercise plenary review over 
legal issues. Id. 
 
Although the parties have briefed the procedural issue of whether an 
administrative expense can be asserted in a proof of claim, that issue is 
not properly before us because it is not part of the district court's 
order. 
Moreover, because we conclude that the fines here are not administrative 
expenses, we need not decide whether the administrative expense claim 
was properly asserted. 
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administrative expense under S 503(b)(1)(A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The DER bases its argument upon the 
nonexclusive nature of the list of expenses in S 503(b), and 
the fact that other courts have held that tort damages, 
post-petition civil penalties, and civil environmental fines 
are administrative expenses. The DER insists that there is 
no rational basis to distinguish those civil penalties from 
these criminal fines. According to the DER, both must be 
treated as an "actual necessary expense of preserving the 
estate" under S 503(b). Appellant's Br. at 10. The DER 
seeks to bolster this argument with policy considerations. It 
insists that if criminal fines are not given priority, "Chapter 
11 debtors in possession [will be encouraged] to disregard 
criminal statutes and other valid laws that might impede a 
debtor in possession's effort to turn a profit," because such 
a debtor can violate the law "secure in the knowledge that 
no economic punishment would follow." Appellant's Br. at 
23-24. The DER warns that this would "create[ ] an 
incentive for any marginal corporate business to attempt to 
free itself from regulatory restraints by seeking the safe 
haven of Chapter 11 protection." Id. at 24. 
 
The trustee's rejoinder relies heavily upon our decision in 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental 
Resources v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1994). 3 The 
trustee argues that we drew a distinction in Conroy 
between compensatory assessments which may enjoy 
priority status as actual administrative expenses, and non- 
compensatory assessments which do not reimburse 
creditors for actual expenses. The trustee argues that 
because Congress expressly refers to non-compensatory 
criminal fines and penalties elsewhere in the Code, it would 
have expressly included such fines under S 503(b) if it 
intended to treat them as administrative expenses. The 
trustee also adds its own policy "spin" to rebut the policy 
considerations that the DER urges upon us. The trustee 
argues that non-compensatory criminal fines survive 
bankruptcy, and can be assessed against the corporation or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Tri-State Clinical Laboratories and the trustee are jointly listed as 
"appellee" on the briefs and in the caption. Inasmuch as we are deciding 
the validity of the trustee's objection in the bankruptcy court we will 
refer to the appellee as the "trustee." 
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corporate officers individually. Thus, those who are 
responsible for the operation of the business have no 
incentive to cut costs by violating the law as the DER 
suggests. Appellee's Br. at 24-25. 
 
B. 
 
The starting point of any statutory analysis is the 
language of the statute. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public 
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990); Kelly v. 
Robinson, 479 U.S. 40, 43 (1986). Thus, we begin at the 
beginning by examining the text of the statute. In doing so, 
"we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of 
a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and 
to its object and policy." Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
 
       (b) [T]here shall be allowed, administrative expenses, 
       . . . including -- 
 
       (1)(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of 
       preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or 
       commissions for services rendered after the 
       commencement of the case . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. S 503(b)(1)(A) (1997). Thus, for a claim to be given 
priority as an administrative expense under this provision 
of the Code, it must be (1) a "cost" or "expense" that is (2) 
"actual" and "necessary" to (3) "preserving the estate." 
 
We construe the words of a statute according to their 
ordinary meaning, unless the context suggests otherwise. 
See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); 
Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 1998). In Reading Co. v. Brown, the Supreme 
Court concluded that "the words `preserving the estate' 
include the larger objective, common to arrangements, of 
operating the debtor's business with a view to rehabilitating 
it." 391 U.S. 471, 476-77 (1968). The dictionary defines 
"necessary" as "absolutely required" or"needed to bring 
about a certain effect or result." Webster's II New Riverside 
University Dictionary 787 (1994). However, the Supreme 
Court has held that the concept of "necessary costs" under 
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the Code is somewhat broader than would be suggested by 
the dictionary definition. Thus, " `usual and necessary 
costs' should include costs ordinarily incident to operation 
of a business, and not be limited to costs without which 
rehabilitation would be impossible." Reading, 391 U.S. at 
483. 
 
To determine Congress' intent in enacting S 503(b)(1)(A), 
we also must consider the other provisions of S 503. See 
Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-09 (1978) ("a word is known 
by the company it keeps"). Section 503(b) specifically lists 
several expenditures that are included within the meaning 
of "administrative expenses." These include certain taxes 
and fines or penalties that relate to those taxes, id. at 
S 503(b)(1)(B) & (C); compensation for services rendered by 
trustees and indenture trustees, id. at S 503(b)(2) & 
S 503(b)(5); the actual, necessary expenses incurred by 
certain creditors pressing their claims, id. at S 503(b)(3); 
reasonable compensation for the professional services of 
attorneys and accountants who provide particular services, 
id. at S 503(b)(4); and other specified fees and mileage, 
S 503(b)(6). These specified administrative expenses all 
describe compensation for services that are necessarily 
incident to the operation of a business, see, e.g., 
S 503(b)(2), (4) & (5), or reimbursement for actual expenses 
incurred, see, e.g., S 503(b)(3) & (6).4 Moreover, paragraph 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although taxes incurred by the estate, as well as fines and penalties 
relating to those taxes, are expressly included inS 503's definition of 
administrative expense, taxes are treated uniquely throughout the 
Bankruptcy Code, and the policies underlying the treatment of taxes do 
not apply to other debts and expenses. Thus, the inclusion of taxes and 
tax penalties in this section is not particularly helpful to our analysis. 
Indeed, to the extent that the express reference to tax penalties in S 503 
implies anything, it implies that Congress did not intend to include non- 
compensatory criminal fines and penalties within the category of 
"administrative expenses." Pursuant to well-established canons of 
construction, the fact that Congress expressly included tax fines and 
penalties in S 503 implies that had Congress intended to include other 
types of fines and penalties within the class of administrative expenses, 
it would have done so expressly. See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23 
(1997) (" `[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of 
a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ") (quoting Russello v. United States, 
464 U.S. 16, 23 91983) (other internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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(1)(A) designates "wages, salaries, or commissions for 
services rendered after the commencement of the case" as 
"actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
estate." See S 503(1)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
language of S 503(b), read as a whole, suggests a quid pro 
quo pursuant to which the estate accrues a debt in 
exchange for some consideration necessary to the operation 
or rehabilitation of the estate. Priority, therefore, is afforded 
such expenses to compensate the providers of necessary 
goods, services or labor. 
 
Such a construction is supported by the purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11 is intended to "rehabilitat[e] 
the debtor and avoid[ ] forfeiture by creditors." Pioneer 
Investment Services, 507 U.S. at 389. The drafters of the 
Code recognized that to achieve that purpose, the debtor 
has to continue to operate between the filing of the petition 
and the adjudication of bankruptcy. This can result in 
additional expenses that are necessary to the continued 
operation of the business or to successfully winding it 
down. Congress recognized this need to provide an 
incentive to creditors who otherwise would not continue to 
provide services to a failing business. Accordingly,"the 
actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
estate" are given priority under the Code. See H.R. Rep. No. 
95-595, at 186-187 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6147 ("Those who must wind up the affairs of a 
debtor's estate must be assured of payment, or else they 
will not participate in the liquidation or distribution of the 
estate."); id. at 187, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6147-6148 ("The 
purpose of [giving priority to wages earned within three 
months before bankruptcy,] as with the administrative 
expense priority, is in part to ensure that employees will 
not abandon a failing business for fear of not being paid."); 
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States, H.R. Doc. 93-137, pt. 1, at 214 (1973) 
[hereinafter "Commission Report to the House"] 
(recommending priority status for administrative expenses 
incurred during the reorganization period because"[s]uch 
expenses must be paid first to assure the availability of the 
services needed to administer a liquidation or 
reorganization case."). Absent the priority established under 
S 503, a debtor in possession could not keep its employees, 
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nor obtain services necessary to its operation as it attempts 
to reorganize, or wind-down pending ultimate liquidation. 
We believe the relevance of this consideration extends to 
interpreting Congress' intent in according priority to certain 
claims under Chapter 7. 
 
The Supreme Court's holding in Reading illustrates these 
principles. In Reading, I. J. Knight Realty Corporation filed 
a petition for an arrangement under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Act which was then in effect.5  The district court 
appointed a receiver, and authorized him to continue to 
conduct the debtor's business of leasing an industrial 
building. Thereafter the building was totally destroyed by a 
fire which spread to the surrounding property. In a 
resulting tort action, one of the adjacent property owners 
recovered a judgment against the receiver in an effort to 
obtain compensation for the damage the fire inflicted upon 
its property as a result of the receiver's negligence. Because 
the debtor in possession was in bankruptcy, an issue arose 
as to the priority that the judgment should be accorded 
against the bankrupt estate. The Supreme Court held that 
the tort judgment was entitled to priority as an 
administrative expense under S 64a(1) of the Bankruptcy 
Act, 11 U.S.C. S 104(a)(1), even though the expense was not 
technically a cost of preserving the estate.6 
 
The Court's holding was motivated by the considerations 
of fairness and practicality which underlie the purposes of 
the bankruptcy laws. The Court believed that those who 
continue to transact business with the debtor during the 
Chapter 11 case, and who suffer financially as a result, are 
entitled to priority over other creditors who have not 
affirmatively assumed such risk. The Court reasoned that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The prior Bankruptcy Act is analogous to the current version. 
 
6. Section 64a of the prior Bankruptcy Act defined administrative 
expenses in relevant part as follows: 
 
       The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends 
       to creditors and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and 
the 
       order of payment, shall be (1) the costs and expenses of 
       administration, including the actual and necessary costs and 
       expenses of preserving the estate subsequent tofiling the petition 
       . . . . 
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fairness dictates that those injured by the operation of a 
bankrupt business by a receiver acting within the scope of 
his authority be compensated for the injury. The Court 
concluded that it simply is not fair to deny innocent victims 
compensation for injuries they would not have incurred had 
the law not allowed the debtor to continue operating its 
business. Because Reading is so important to our inquiry 
we take the liberty of quoting the Court's opinion at length. 
The Court stated: 
 
       In our view the trustee has overlooked one important, 
       and here decisive, statutory objective: fairness to all 
       persons having claims against an insolvent. Petitioner 
       suffered grave financial injury from what is here agreed 
       to have been the negligence of the receiver and a 
       workman. It is conceded that, in principle, petitioner 
       has a right to recover for that injury from their 
       `employer,' the business under arrangement, upon the 
       rule of respondeat superior. Respondents contend, 
       however, that petitioner is in no different position from 
       anyone else injured by a person with scant assets: its 
       right to recover exists in theory but is not enforceable 
       in practice. 
 
        That, however, is not an adequate description of 
       petitioner's position. At the moment when an 
       arrangement is sought, the debtor is insolvent. Its 
       existing creditors hope that by partial or complete 
       postponement of their claims, they will through 
       successful rehabilitation, eventually recover from the 
       debtor either in full or in larger proportion than they 
       would in immediate bankruptcy. Hence the present 
       petitioner did not merely suffer injury at the hands of 
       an insolvent business: it had an insolvent business 
       thrust upon it by operation of law. That business will, 
       in any event, be unable to pay its fire debts in full. But 
       the question is whether the fire claimants should be 
       subordinated to, should share equally with, or collect 
       ahead of those creditors for whose benefit the 
       continued operation of the business (which 
       unfortunately led to the fire instead of the hoped-for 
       rehabilitation) was allowed. . . . The `master,' liable for 
       the negligence of the `servant' in this case was the 
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       business operating under Chapter XI arrangement for 
       the benefit of creditors and with the hope of 
       rehabilitation. That benefit and that rehabilitation are 
       worthy objectives. But it would be inconsistent both 
       with the principle of respondeat superior and with the 
       rule of fairness in bankruptcy to seek these objectives 
       at the cost of excluding tort creditors of the 
       arrangement from its assets, or totally subordinating 
       the claims of those on whom the arrangement is 
       imposed to the claims of those for whose benefit it is 
       instituted. 
 
       * * * 
 
        In considering whether those injured by the 
       operation of the business during an arrangement 
       should share equally with, or recover ahead of, those 
       for whose benefit the business is carried on, the latter 
       seems more natural and just. Existing creditors are, to 
       be sure, in a dilemma not of their own making, but 
       there is no obvious reason why they should be allowed 
       to attempt to escape that dilemma at the risk of 
       imposing it on others equally innocent. 
 
391 U.S. at 477-83. 
 
The Court also considered the practical consequences of 
not allowing the tort claimant to recover ahead of other 
creditors. 
 
       More directly in point is the possibility of insurance. An 
       arrangement may provide for suitable coverage, and 
       the Court below recognized that the cost of insurance 
       against tort claims arising during an arrangement is an 
       administrative expense payable in full under S 64a(1) 
       . . . It is . . . obvious that proper insurance premiums 
       must be given priority, else insurance could not be 
       obtained; and if a receiver or debtor in possession is to 
       be encouraged to obtain insurance in adequate 
       amounts, the claims against which insurance is 
       obtained should be potentially payable in full. 
 
Id. at 483. 
 
Thirdly, the Court considered the background of tort law. 
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       It has long been the rule of equity receiverships that 
       torts of the receivership create claims against the 
       receivership itself; in those cases the statutory 
       limitation to "actual and necessary costs" is not 
       involved, but the explicit recognition extended to tort 
       claims in those cases weighs heavily in favor of 
       considering them within the general category of costs 
       and expenses. 
 
Id. at 485. The Court concluded that, because the torts of 
a receivership create claims against the receiver, it could 
not distinguish between claims arising from conduct which 
is integral to the operation of the business, and torts 
arising from "nonessential" activity. 
 
       No principle of tort law of which we are aware offers 
       guidance for distinguishing, within the class of torts 
       committed by receivers while acting in furtherance of 
       the business, between those "integral" to the business 
       and those that are not. . . . We hold that damages 
       resulting from the negligence of a receiver acting within 
       the scope of his authority as receiver give rise to 
       "actual and necessary costs" of a Chapter XI 
       arrangement. 
 
Id. Inasmuch as the receiver was acting within the scope of 
its authority, the demands of fair compensation required 
that persons who were injured by the receiver's negligence 
be compensated. This, in turn, required giving their claims 
priority over the claims of other creditors.7 
 
Here, allowing the DER's claim to be treated as an 
administrative expense will allow that claim to be paid to 
the exclusion of, and out of the resources otherwise 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We realize that the debtor in Reading was seeking an arrangement 
under Chapter 11, and the Court reached its holding in that context. 
Here, of course, the defendant initially filed for the contemporary 
counterpart of an arrangement -- a reorganization-- under Chapter 11, 
and the case was thereafter converted to a liquidation ("straight 
bankruptcy" using the terms of the prior Bankruptcy Act). However, we 
think this is a distinction without a difference. In Reading the Court 
noted: "It is agreed that this section [64a] applicable by its terms to 
straight bankruptcies, governs payment of administration expenses of 
Chapter XI arrangements". 391 U.S. at 475. 
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available for, claims of other creditors. The practical result 
would be that fines for committing crimes would be paid by 
innocent third persons -- the creditors -- rather than Tri- 
State -- the criminal. That is as unfair as it is impractical. 
The payment of the criminal fine would not compensate for 
any damages resulting from Tri-State's conduct. It would 
merely cause Tri-State to satisfy its obligations to the state 
out of the pockets of Tri-State's creditors. 
 
The DER argues that the cost of complying with the 
criminal laws is a necessary cost of doing business (no less 
than taxes, wages, or fees), and therefore any criminal 
penalties in the form of fines resulting from violating the 
law must be treated as an administrative expense. Thus, 
the DER would have us hold that a violation of a criminal 
law intended to protect public safety is necessary or 
ordinarily incident to operating a business, and therefore, is 
incurred as an expense of "preserving the estate." However, 
the DER fails to recognize that, even if the costs associated 
with operating a business in accordance with the law are 
necessary to preserving the estate, it does not follow that 
criminal fines and the conduct they attempt to punish are 
ordinarily incident to operating a business. We refuse to 
adopt an analysis of administrative expenses that is based 
upon the assumption that legitimate businesses engage in 
a "cost-benefit" analysis to determine if they will comply 
with criminal laws that protect the very public that the 
owners and operators of those legitimate businesses are 
part of. It is neither reasonable nor necessary for a 
commercial enterprise to violate criminal laws and 
endanger the public to preserve the estate or to conduct 
legitimate business operations, and we refuse the DER's 
invitation to hold otherwise. Rather, we believe Congress 
intended only for those "actual necessary costs and 
expenses" that arise in the context of, or compensate for, 
legitimate business activity, or the losses resulting 
therefrom, to be treated as expenses of preserving the 
estate, and accorded priority as an administrative expense. 
 
Although both parties to this appeal rely upon our 
holding in Conroy, supra, to support their arguments, we 
view Conroy as supporting the distinction we draw between 
claims for compensatory expenses and those for criminal 
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fines. In Conroy, the DER filed a claim for reimbursement 
for costs incurred in cleaning up hazardous chemicals at a 
site the Chapter 11 debtors had attempted to abandon. In 
holding that those costs were administrative expenses 
entitled to priority we said: 
 
       [I]f the DER had not itself undertaken to clean up the 
       [site,] the Conroys could not have escaped their 
       obligation to do so by abandoning the hazardous 
       property in question. Furthermore, if Frank Conroy 
       had arranged for cleanup of the facility after he had 
       filed a Chapter 11 petition, the costs of this cleanup 
       would have constituted administrative expenses under 
       11 U.S. C. S 503(b)(1)(A), since they are a portion of `the 
       actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
       estate.' 
 
Id. at 569. We also held that reimbursement for that 
portion of the administrative and legal costs incurred in 
arranging for cleanup which the DER had "sufficiently 
substantiated" as reasonable compensation also qualified 
as an administrative expense. Id. at 570-71. By cleaning up 
the site, the DER provided a service to the debtor-- a 
service that the debtor itself would have had to perform 
during the course of normal operations -- and therefore, 
the DER was entitled to compensation for that service. 
 
The situation here is quite different. Tri-State was not 
required to endanger the health and welfare of residents of 
the community by illegally disposing of test tubes 
containing blood, and the sanction that was imposed as 
punishment for doing so has nothing to do with 
compensation or proper business operations. Rather the 
purpose of this criminal fine is deterrence, retribution, and 
punishment. 
 
C. 
 
Our conclusion is also consistent with the legislative 
history relating to the classification of non-compensatory 
criminal fines and penalties. Before Congress replaced the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with the current Bankruptcy Code, 
a creditor had to show that a claim was both "allowable" 
(under S 57 of that Act), and "provable" (under S 63 of that 
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Act) before the creditor could participate in the distribution 
of assets at all. See H.R. Doc. 93-137, pt. 1, at 21 (1973); 
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1986). Section 57(j) 
specifically excluded criminal penalties from the class of 
allowable debts insofar as they did not compensate for an 
actual loss. Section 57(j) of the Act provided: 
 
       Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a 
       district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture 
       shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the 
       pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or 
       proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose. 
 
30 Stat. 561 (emphasis added). Section 63 defined 
"provable" debts to include criminal penalties. Thus, by the 
early 1970s, when Congress began reexamining the 
bankruptcy laws, it was well established that criminal fines 
were not allowable debts subject to distribution from the 
estate under Chapter 7.8 
 
In 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States, which was established to propose changes to 
the bankruptcy laws, recommended combining the concepts 
of "allowable" and "provable" claims into a single enlarged 
class of "allowable" claims. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt.1, at 
21. The Commission also recommended subordinating 
certain claims to other unsecured claims within that large 
class. Among this class of subordinated claims were claims 
specified in S 4-406(a) of the proposed bill, including "any 
claim, whether secured or unsecured, to the extent it is for 
a fine, penalty or forfeiture or for multiple, punitive or 
exemplary claims." Id. at 22 and pt. 2, at 115. The 
Commission recommended changing the law to subordinate 
such claims, rather than disallowing them, "to prevent the 
debtor from obtaining a windfall of a disallowance intended 
only to benefit its creditors." The Bankruptcy Reform Act: 
Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Tri-State's bankruptcy is an example of the frequency with which 
cases begun under Chapter 11 eventually convert to Chapter 7. We do 
not think that the conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 alters our 
analysis. See Reading, supra (noting that the provisions for straight 
bankruptcies govern priority under an arrangement under the prior 
Code). 
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Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 761 (1975) [hereinafter "Hearings 
S. 235"]. In that same Report, the Commission also 
recommended establishing three categories of priority 
claims: (1) administrative expenses, which the Commission 
explained "must necessarily be given first priority in order 
for estates to be liquidated and any distributions made to 
any creditors"; (2) wages; and (3) taxes accruing within one 
year prior to bankruptcy. H.R. Doc. 93-137, pt.1, at 21. 
 
Based on the Commission's recommendations, the House 
and the Senate drafted bills which provided for 
subordinating and prioritizing certain kinds of claims. The 
relevant provision, which was set forth in S 4-406 in both 
bills, expressly subordinated any claim for a fine, penalty, 
or multiple, punitive, or exemplary damages. See H.R. 
10792, 93rd Cong. (1973); S. 236, 94th Cong. (1975). In 
prepared remarks before the Senate subcommittee drafting 
the proposed legislation, the Commission explained that 
this subordination "is derived from sec. 57 of the present 
Act which disallows fines, penalties, and forfeitures owing 
the government. This provision simply subordinates. It 
won't change the result in many cases but prevents any 
return to a solvent debtor who has incurred a penalty and 
extends the principle to exemplary and [sic] damages." 
Hearings S. 235 at 15 (emphasis added). 
 
In drafting the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress 
considered the policy ramifications of subordinating 
criminal penalties to unsecured debts. During 
congressional hearings the Assistant Attorney General for 
the Civil Division of the Department of Justice argued that 
criminal judgments should not be subordinated, stating: 
"Fine judgments represent a solemn judgment rendered 
against a debtor for a crime against society. Thefine debtor 
has not paid his debt to society until the fine is satisfied. As 
a matter of public policy such judgments should at least 
share priority with the Government's non-tax claims and 
not be subordinated." Hearings S. 235 at 478. The 
American Life Insurance Association argued to the contrary: 
"[The Civil Division] overlooks the fact that in a bankruptcy 
situation, the other creditors in effect end up paying the 
fine if it is not subordinated. For that reason, it should not 
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be paid out of the estate unless all other claims 
(subordinated or unsubordinated) are first paid in full." 
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1590-91 
(1976). Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
recommended deleting S 4-406 entirely and substituting in 
its place S 57(j) of the original Bankruptcy Act, which 
disallowed fines and penalties. Hearings S. 235 at 736. The 
SEC favored disallowance over subordination because it 
feared that subordinated fines and penalties would still 
take priority over the interests of stockholders. Id. 
 
The statute as enacted did not include a separate section 
covering subordinated claims. Instead, Congress enacted 
S 726, "Distribution of property of the estate," which 
"dictates the order in which [sic] distribution of property of 
the estate, which has usually been reduced to money by 
the trustee under the requirements of section 704(1)." S. 
Rep. No. 95-989, at 96-97 (1978). Section 726 provides in 
relevant part: 
 
       (a) . . . [P]roperty of the estate shall be distributed-- 
 
       (1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified 
       in, and in the order specified in, section 507 of this 
       title [referring to administrative expenses under 
       S 503]; 
 
       (2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured 
       claim . . . proof of which is [timely filed under 
       sections 501(a), (b), or (c), or tardily filed under 
       section 501(a)]; 
 
       (3) third, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim 
       proof of which is tardily filed under section 501(a) 
       . . .; 
 
       (4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether 
       secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or 
       forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive 
       damages, arising before the earlier of the order for 
       relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent 
       such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not 
       compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by 
       the holder of such claim; 
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       (5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from 
       the date of the filing of the petition, on any claim 
       paid under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this 
       subsection; and 
 
       (6) sixth, to the debtor. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 726. The Senate explained paragraph (4) as 
follows: 
 
       Fourth, distribution is to holders of fine, penalty, 
       forfeiture, or multiple, punitive, or exemplary damage 
       claims. More of these claims are disallowed entirely 
       under present law. They are simply subordinated here. 
       Paragraph (4) provides that punitive penalties, 
       including pre-petition tax penalties, are subordinated 
       to the payment of all other classes of claims, except 
       claims for interest accruing during the case. In effect, 
       these penalties are payable out of the estate's assets 
       only if and to the extent that a surplus of assets would 
       otherwise remain at the close of the case for distribution 
       back to the debtor. 
 
S. Rep. No. 95-989 at 97 (emphasis added). Thus, 
prepetition fines were accorded second class status in the 
distribution scheme. 
 
This provision works in tandem with S 523 of the current 
version of the Code, which governs the dischargeability of 
debts at the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings. To 
understand S 523, however, it is useful to understand its 
history as well. Section 17 of the old Bankruptcy Act 
provided that a discharge in bankruptcy released a debtor 
from all provable debts at the conclusion of the bankruptcy 
case with four specified exceptions. Although criminal 
penalties were not excepted from discharge underS 17, 
courts historically had refused to discharge state criminal 
penalties under federal bankruptcy because of 
considerations of comity. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44-46. In 
1978, Congress codified this judicial exception to 
dischargeability of criminal fines and penalties in S 523. 
That section, entitled "Exceptions to Discharge," provides: 
 
       (a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 
       1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an 
       individual debtor from any debt -- 
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       . . . (7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or 
       forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a 
       governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual 
       pecuniary loss, . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(7); see also FRBP Official Form 18 
(9/97), Explanation of Bankruptcy Discharge in a Chapter 
7 Case ("Some of the common types of debts which are not 
discharged in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case are . . .[d]ebts 
for most fines, penalties, forfeitures, or criminal restitution 
obligations."). 
 
The Supreme Court explained the evolution of this 
exception to discharge in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 40 
(1986). In that case, a defendant was ordered to pay 
restitution as a condition of probation after pleading guilty 
to welfare fraud. After she was sentenced, she filed a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 listing 
the restitution obligation as a debt. The appropriate state 
agencies did not file a proof of claim in the court for the 
outstanding restitution, but the bankruptcy court 
nevertheless ruled that the restitution payments were not 
dischargeable under S 523(a)(7) of the Code. The court held 
that, even though restitution reimburses the victim of 
criminal activity, its purpose is rehabilitation, and not 
compensation. Thus, the criminal statute focused" `upon 
the offender and not the . . . the victim, . . . restitution is 
part of the criminal penalty rather than compensation for a 
victim's actual loss.' " Kelly, 479 U.S. at 41. The district 
court agreed, but the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed. It held that restitution was a"debt" as 
that term was defined in the Bankruptcy Code. It relied 
upon legislative history to conclude that "Congress intended 
to broaden the definition of "debt" from the narrower 
definition of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898." Id. The Court of 
Appeals further concluded that the restitution was 
discharged under S 523(a)(7), which provides for automatic 
discharge of certain debts. The Supreme Court reversed, 
relying in part on an opinion the New York Supreme Court 
had reached four years before Congress enacted the current 
Bankruptcy Code. The Supreme Court stated: 
 
       A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever 
       upon a condition of restitution of a criminal sentence. 
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       A bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature and is 
       intended to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of 
       his debts and to permit him to begin his financial life 
       anew. A condition of restitution in a sentence of 
       probation is a part of the judgment of conviction. It 
       does not create a debt nor a debtor-creditor 
       relationship between the persons making and receiving 
       restitution. As with any other condition of a 
       probationary sentence, it is intended as a means to 
       insure the defendant will lead a law-abiding life 
       thereafter. 
 
        Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the 
       background of an established judicial exception to 
       discharge for criminal sentences . . . an exception 
       created in the face of a statute drafted with 
       considerable care and specificity. 
 
479 U.S. at 46 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
Four years later the Supreme Court elaborated upon the 
holding in Kelly, and emphasized the extent to which the 
purpose of the Code was relevant to determining 
dischargeability. In Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990), the Court held 
that, even though restitution payments were not discharged 
under Chapter 7, such payments were dischargeable 
"debts" under Chapter 13. The Court explained: 
 
       [I]n locating Congress' policy choice regarding the 
       dischargeability of restitution orders in S 523(a)(7), 
       Kelly is faithful to the language and structure of the 
       Code: Congress defined "debt" broadly and took care to 
       except particular debts from discharge where policy 
       considerations so warranted. Accordingly, Congress 
       secured a broader discharge for debtors under Chapter 
       13 than Chapter 7 by extending to Chapter 13 
       proceedings some, but not all, of S 523(a)'s exceptions 
       to discharge. . . . Among those exceptions that 
       Congress chose not to extend to Chapter 13 
       proceedings is S 523(a)(7)'s exception for debts arising 
       from a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture." Thus, to construe 
       "debt" narrowly in this context would be to override the 
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       balance Congress struck in crafting the appropriate 
       discharge exceptions for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
       debtors. 
 
495 U.S. at 562-3. 
 
We conclude that the policy considerations evidenced by 
the aforementioned legislative history, as well as the text of 
the Code and the cases interpreting it, support our view 
that non-compensatory criminal fines imposed on a 
Chapter 7 debtor or trustee should not be deemed 
administrative expenses. This interpretation also is 
consistent with Congress' limitation on the dischargeability 
of criminal fines and penalties. Under Chapter 7, that 
portion of a fine that is compensatory is discharged. 11 
U.S.C. S 523(7). See Davenport, 495 U.S. at 559 ("The Court 
in Kelly analyzed the purposes of restitution in construing 
the qualifying clauses of S 523(a)(7), which explicitly tie the 
application of that provision to the purpose of the 
compensation required."). We do not believe that Congress 
intended for us to ignore the non-compensatory character 
of a criminal fine in deciding if it is an administrative 
expense under S 503, while explicitly requiring that 
consideration under S 523(7). Rather, for the reasons 
previously stated, we conclude that S 503's restriction to 
"expenses of preserving the estate" limits such expenses to 
those that constitute compensation for expenditures 
necessary to the operation of the debtor-in-possession's 
business. As we noted above, we will not stretch our policy 
analysis to include within this category the payment of the 
criminal fines for Tri-State's conduct here. 
 
We recognize, of course, that Tri-State may not have the 
funds to pay this fine after the estate is liquidated. 
However, that is often a possibility when criminalfines are 
imposed, and we see nothing in the statutes that Tri-State 
has violated, nor anything endemic to the process of 
bankruptcy, that would justify us in removing the 
Commonwealth's hand from the empty pockets of the 
criminal, and placing it in the pockets of creditors merely 
because those pockets are deeper. Tri-State was sentenced 
while in bankruptcy for an act that occurred after it filed its 
bankruptcy petition. The sentencing judge clearly knew 
that Tri-State's ability to pay any fine was suspect at best. 
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Yet, the sanction here was on the corporate entity, not 
upon the responsible individuals. It should not now come 
as any great surprise that the bankrupt debtor lacks the 
resources to pay this criminal fine and meet its obligations 
to creditors. Tri-State's precarious financial condition does 
not, however, allow us to stretch the concept of 
administrative expense to remedy the DER's predicament. 
 
D. 
 
Finally, we realize, of course, that there is a certain 
tension between our analysis here, and the analysis in N.P. 
Mining Co. v. Alabama Surface Mining Commission, 963 
F2d. 1449 (11th Cir. 1992). There, the court held that civil 
fines imposed solely as punishment for violation of 
environmental regulations were entitled to priority as an 
administrative expense under Chapter 11. The holding was 
based upon the requirement in S 969(b) that the trustee or 
debtor in possession manage and operate the property in 
compliance with state law. The court of appeals reasoned 
that 
 
       [i]f postpetition costs "ordinarily incident to operation 
       of a business" that do not confer a benefit on the estate 
       [the tort claims in Reading] can indeed qualify as 
       "actual, necessary" expenses of preserving the estate, 
       then a strong case can be made that when a licensed 
       business operates in the regulated atmosphere of strip 
       mining in Alabama, incurring regulatory penalties is a 
       cost ordinarily incident to operation of a business and 
       should be accorded administrative-expense priority. 
 
Id at 1454-5. 
 
However, we do not think that rationale applies here, 
even if it is appropriate for a civil fine on a business in a 
heavily regulated industry. As noted above, doing so would 
require us to infer that disposing of infectious human waste 
in a manner that not only endangers members of the 
general public, but also constitutes criminal activity, is part 
of the ordinary and necessary operations of a business. 
Moreover, the court in N.P. Mining stressed that the 
violation before it did not involve safety. See N.P. Mining, 
963 F.2d at 1458 ("Here, there is no threat to public health 
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or safety."). We are not convinced the court's holding would 
be the same if it were faced with the kind of reckless 
conduct in which Tri-State engaged. Finally, the court in 
N.P. Mining did not consider the extensive legislative history 
regarding prepetition penalties to be as relevant as we do in 
determining whether punitive criminal fines should be given 
preferential treatment. See id. at 1452 (stating "[t]he 
legislative history of section 503(b) as well as the legislative 
history of other relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code, 
is silent regarding the treatment of punitive post petition 
penalties"). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by N.P. 
Mining, the cases upon which it relies, or the cases that 
have relied upon N.P. Mining. See, e.g. , In re Bill's Coal 
Company, Inc., 124 B.R. 827 (D. Kan. 1991); In re 
Charlesbank Laundry, Inc., 755 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1985); In 
re Double B Distributors, Inc., 176 B.R. 271 (Bky. M.D.Fla. 
1994); In re Motel Investments, Inc., 172 B.R. 105 (Bky. 
M.D.Fla. 1994). 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
In sum, based on the plain language of the Bankruptcy 
Code, its purpose and legislative history, and the principles 
of fairness upon which the Code is grounded, we hold that 
punitive criminal fines arising from post-petition behavior 
are not administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C.S 503(b), 
and therefore, are not accorded priority status pursuant to 
S 507(a)(1). Therefore, the orders of the Bankruptcy Court 
and the District Court will be affirmed in accordance with 
this decision. 
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